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ANJELINO v. NEW YORK TIMES CO.:
GRANTING MEN STANDING TO FIGHT AGAINST INJURIES
RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION TOWARDS
FEMALE CO-WORKERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recognizing the prevalence of discriminatory employment practices
in the United States, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII"). 1 Title VII provides that it "shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .
2..."2Although Title VII, as enacted, includes sex-based discrimination, Congress
did not originally intend to include sex-based discrimination in the act
and did not amend Title VII to include the word "sex" until the day before
3
it passed.
1. See H.R. REp. No. 88-914, at 26-29 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2355, 2513-15 (recognizing prevalence of discriminatory employment practices);
see also H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2139 (noting that Congress "recognized the prevalence of discriminatory practices" and realized Federal legislation was needed to deal with problem). In the
1960s, there was a gross disparity in the unemployment rates between minorities
and white individuals. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 26-29 (noting unemployment
rates). In 1962, the unemployment rate of minorities was more than twice the
unemployment rate of white workers. See id. at 27 (noting discrimination in employment). In addition, among the minorities who were employed, theirjobs were
primarily in the semiskilled and unskilled occupations, whereas the employed Caucasians held mostly professional jobs. See id. at 27-28 (same). According to the
House Report, discrimination in the workforce has a twofold effect on the country's economy. See id. at 28-29 (noting effect of discrimination on economy). First,
the purchasing power of the country is not being fully developed because several
minorities are without the income to purchase goods, which stalls any potential
increase in gross national product. See id. (same). Secondly, the country is stuck
with payment of unemployment compensation, relief, disease and crime. See id.
(same). Consequently, it is the House's belief that equality in the workforce will
bring prosperity to minorities as well as to the country. See id. (noting need to end
discrimination).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & (a)(1) (1994).
3. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing legislative history of Title VII). Ironically, the amendment was offered by a southern
opponent to Tide VII who put the amendment on the floor in a last ditch effort to
block the bill that became Title VII. See id. at 987 (discussing addition of word
"sex" to Title VII protections). Much to his surprise, the majority quickly accepted
the amendment and Title VII was passed. See id. (discussing adoption of Tide VII).
Contrary to the atmosphere when Tide VII was first adopted, when the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, sex-based discrimination was at the forefront of the legislature's discussions.
See id. (noting legislature's deep concern about sex-based discrimination in years
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The fact that Congress was a day shy from passing Title VII without
including sex-based discrimination was perhaps an omen that sex discrimination would be difficult to remove from the workplace. Even though Title VII specifically prohibits sex discrimination, it continues to be
prevalent in the workplace. 4 Numerous studies show that women work in
segregated jobs where at least seventy percent of the overall workforce is
female, and the positions held by the females are the "less challenging, the
less responsible, and the less remunerative positions." 5 Furthermore, studies suggest that the number of sexual harassment cases continues to rise as
more women enter the work force. 6 The continued presence of sex disfollowing adoption of Title VII). Despite Title VII's prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex, studies taken in the years following the passage of Title
VII showed that women were still being placed in "less challenging, less responsible, and less remunerative positions" solely because of their sex. H.R. REP. No. 92238, at 4-5. Alarmed that the passage of Title VII did little to improve the status of
women in the workforce, Congress now considered "discrimination against women .. .no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices
and ...[vowed to give it] the same degree of social concern given to any type of
unlawful discrimination." Id. at 5.
4. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (noting that despite progress made since
enactment of Title VII, discrimination against women continues). For a discussion
of the prevalence of discriminatory employment practices towards women, see infta notes 5-7 and accompanying text. Although sex discrimination can be directed
at both males and females, this Casebrief deals only with situations where the sex
discrimination is directed at females.
5. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5; accord Martha Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire
Spectrum" of DisparateTreatment Under Title VII: Rules Governing PredominantlyFemale
Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) (noting that half of all female workers are
employed in positions dominated by females). Female employees normally occupy
the following professions: clerks, saleswomen, waitresses, hairdressers, teachers and
nurses. See id. at 2 n.3 (describing typical "female" jobs). Only six percent of females are managers and administrators, and only two percent are in skilled craft
jobs. See id. (comparing female-dominated jobs with male-dominated jobs). Studies show that employees, whether male or female, who occupy female-dominated
jobs, received about $3,500 less a year than employees in male-dominated jobs. See
Donna Leinwand, Pay Gender Gap Is Narrowing, But Slowly: Women Earn Average 24
Percent Less Than Men, But Employers Say Issue Is Complex, DET. NEWS, Sept. 5, 1999
(noting that statistics from Labor Department show that "[f]or every dollar a man
earns, a woman gets about 76 cents"); Mary-Kathryn Zachary, Because of Sex-Part II,
The Traditional Cases, SUPERVISION, Jan. 1, 2000, at 22 (noting that in addition to
having different jobs than male employees, female employees also receive less
money than male employees).
6. See 144 CONG. REc. E1081-82 (daily ed. June 10, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton) (noting sexual harassment claims increase as more women enter
workforce). According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), "the number of sexual harassment [claims] filed with the EEOC [has]
increased from 6,800 in 1990 to nearly 16,000 cases in 1997." Id. Furthermore,
most studies of sexual harassment show that somewhere between forty and seventy
percent of female employees experience some type of sexual harassment during
their careers. See Ruth Ann Strickland, Sexual Harassment: A Legal Perspective for
Public Administrators,PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT., Dec. 1995, at 493 (discussing prevalence of sexual harassment). Although both men and women have been subjects
of sexual harassment, studies suggest that women experience all forms of sexual
harassment more than men. See id. (noting that examination of Alabama, Arizona,
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crimination in the workplace results from the female employee's failure to
report the sex discrimination, which is compounded by the fact that courts
disagree about how broadly to define standing when the plaintiff is not the
7
direct target of the discrimination.
Generally, courts readily grant standing to a white plaintiff who alleges that he or she was exposed to, and suffered some injury as a result of
discriminatory employment practices aimed at the plaintiffs minority coworkers. 8 Courts do not take such a broad view in indirect discrimination
cases however when it is a male plaintiff alleging that he suffered some
harm from sex discrimination aimed at his female co-workers. 9 In fact the
majority of the circuits refuse to grant standing to a male employee alleging that he has suffered an injury as a result of his employer's discrimina10
tory employment practices towards female employees.
In a ground-breaking case, Anjelino v. New York Times Co.,1 ' the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was faced with an indirect
discrimination case in which the male plaintiff was charging his employer
with engaging in discriminatory employment practices towards his female
co-workers. 12 The court refused to follow the majority view. 13 Instead, the
court created a circuit split by granting the male employee standing to sue
14
for his employer's discriminatory practices.
In light of this newly created circuit split, this Casebrief discusses
standing in discrimination cases brought under Tide VII and focuses on
standing in sex discrimination cases. Specifically, it analyzes the Third CirTexas, Utah and Wisconsin showed that women experience more sexual harassment than men).
7. See Strickland, supra note 6, at 493 (noting that despite prevalence of sexual
harassment in workplace and its acceptance by courts as actionable claim of sex
discrimination, female employees still fail to report it). For a further discussion of
the reasons why female employees fail to report sexual discrimination, see infra
note 49 and accompanying text. For an analysis of court's disagreement as to the
proper definition of standing in Title VII cases, see infra notes 86-139 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of standing in indirect discrimination cases where the
plaintiff is a white employee alleging that his or her employer engaged in discriminatory employment practices toward minority workers, see infra notes 86-112 and
accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of standing in indirect discrimination cases where the
plaintiff is a male employee alleging his employer engaged in discriminatory employment practices toward female workers, see infra notes 113-27 and accompanying text.
10. For further discussion of the view of the majority of the circuits, see infra
notes 113-27 and accompanying text.

11. 200 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 1999).
12. For a discussion of the facts of Anjelino, see infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the holding of Anjelino, see infra notes 156-78 and accompanying text.
14. For a comparison of the circuits' view of standing in indirect sexual discrimination cases, see infra notes 113-22 and 156-78 and accompanying text.
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cuit's continuously broadening view of standing in discrimination cases
and compares it with the view of other courts. Part II discusses the enactment of Title VII and its use to eliminate sex discrimination, including
sexual harassment, from the workplace. 1 5 Part III focuses on the elements
a plaintiff must satisfy to have standing to present ajusticiable controversy
to the court.' 6 This section concludes with a detailed discussion of standing requirements in Title VII cases, focusing on standing requirements in
sex-based discrimination suits under Title VII.' 7 Part IV discusses the
Third Circuit's decision in Anjelino to expand standing in sex-based discrimination claims under Title VII to include male employees alleging indirect discrimination.' 8 Finally, Part V discusses the impact of the Third
Circuit's decision in Anjelino and comments on the issues the decision left
unanswered. 19
II.
A.

BACKGROUND OF TITLE

VII AND SEx-BASED
TITLE VII

DISCRIMINATION UNDER

Title VII - The Equal Employment Opportunity Act: Developed to Bring
Equality to the Workplace

Title VII was enacted with the primary goal of reducing discrimination in the workforce by providing a mechanism for the country to make
certain that every job is available to every citizen regardless of his or her
race, gender or religion. 20 Specifically, Congress drafted Title VII "to
eradicate discrimination in 'any aspect of the employment relation including hiring, promotion, transfer or firing"' on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion or national origin. 2 ' Congress believed that this elimination of
"discriminatory employment practices would result in the consideration of
15. For a discussion of sexual discrimination under Title VII, see infra notes
23-45 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of constitutional standing requirements and prudential
standing requirements, see infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of standing requirements in Title VII discrimination
cases, see infra notes 78-127 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's view of standing in sexual discrimination cases brought under Title VII, see infra notes 158-78 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of Anjelino, and a discussion of the questions left unanswered by that decision, see infra notes 179-91 and accompanying

text.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 29 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355,
2516 (noting Congress' purpose for enacting Title VII). Title VII established the
EEOC, which is responsible for investigating complaints concerning the existence
of discrimination at places of employment. See id. Although the EEOC's task is to
correct abuse, it is not expected to promote equality with absolute certainty. See id.
at 2516 (noting EEOC's limited role).
21. Laura M. Jordan, Note, The Empathetic, White Male: An Aggrieved Person
Under Title VII?, 55 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 137 (1999) (quoting
RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 160-61 (1992)); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (1) (1994).
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people based on their individual merit, thereby producing the additional
22
benefit of improved efficiency in the marketplace."
B.

Sexual DiscriminationUnder Title VII

Because the word "sex" was added to Title VII's coverage at the last
minute, there is little legislative history concerning discrimination on the
basis of sex.2 3 Despite this absence of legislative history, scholars assume
"that one of Congress' main goals [when deciding to add sex to Title VII]
24
was to provide equal access to the job market for both men and women."
As a result, Congress made it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to provide different opportunities to men than it provides to women. 25 In response to Title VII, courts have held that it is an unlawful
employment practice for employers to discriminate against individuals on
the basis of sex with respect to salaries, required hours and overtime, job
26
Courts
assignments, job promotions, job transfers and fringe benefits.
22. Jordan, supra note 21, at 137 (citations omitted); accord Valerie L. Jacobson, Note, Bringing a Title VII Action: Which Test RegardingStanding to Sue Is the Most
Applicable?, 18 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 95, 95 (1990) (noting Title VII was enacted to
guarantee equality of employment opportunities by eliminating discriminatory
practices).
23. SeeJohn J. Donohue III, ProhibitingSex Discriminationin the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1338 (1989) (noting absence of legislative history concerning issue of sex discrimination).
24. ERNEST C. HADLEY & GEORGE M. CHUZI, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: FEDERAL
LAw 2-3 (1994) (quoting Come v. Bausch & Lamb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz.
1975)). Although Title VII forbids discrimination based on sex, Congress did not
originally intend to include discrimination on the basis of sex in Title VII. See
Barbara L. Zalucki, DiscriminationLaw-Defining the Hostile Work Environment Claim of
Sexual HarassmentUnder Title VII, 11 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 143, 147 (1989) (explaining discrimination on basis of sex was not originally part of Title VII). Discrimination on the basis of sex was added to Title VII's protections the day before the
House of Representatives passed the Act, after Representative Howard Smith of
Virginia proposed an amendment to include sex. See id. (noting Representative
Smith proposed floor amendment to include sex under Title VII). Because sex
was hastily added to Title VII, there is little legislative history relating to discrimination on the basis of sex. See HADLEY & CHUZI, supra at 3 (noting absence of legislative history explaining addition of sex to Title VII). When amending Title VII in
1972, however, Congress explained its position regarding sex-based discrimination
by explaining that "it is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment
practices and is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type
of unlawful discrimination." Zalucki, supra, at 147-48 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92238, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) & (a)(1) (1994) (making it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
sex").
26. See HADLEY & CHUZI, supra note 24, at 3 (setting forth situations where
discrimination on basis of sex constitutes unlawful employment practice (citing
Rosenfield v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) (concluding
that discriminating against individuals with respect to job assignments or transfers
constitutes unlawful employment practice))); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp.,
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were reluctant, however, to conclude that discrimination on the basis of
sex also included sexual harassment in the workplace. 2 7 It was not until
the landmark case of Barnes v. Costle28 that the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that sexual harassment vio29
lated Title VII.
In Barnes, the appellant claimed sex discrimination violative of Title
VII. 30 The crux of her complaint was that she was discriminated against
because she refused to submit to her supervisor's request to have an afterhours affair. 3 ' Finding in favor of the appellant, the D.C. Circuit concluded that sexual harassment is gender-based, and thus falls within the
protections afforded by Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimina325 F. Supp. 1089, 1097-98 (D. Ohio 1971) (concluding that discriminating against
individuals with respect to hours of employment constitutes unlawful employment
practice); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (7th Cir. 1971)
(concluding that discriminating against individuals with respect to fringe benefits,
such as retirement and pension plans constitutes unlawful employment practice);
see also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting Title VII is
"invoked to strike down impediments to equal employment opportunities between
sexes, [such as] discriminatory seniority systems, weight-lifting requirements, and
height and weight standards imposed on only one gender" (citations omitted)).
Title VII, which forbids discrimination "because of [or on the basis of] ...
sex," defines the terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" as "includ [ing] but
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
27. See HADLEY & CHUZI, supra note 24, at 2 (noting courts did not always
conclude that sexual harassment constitutes discrimination on basis of sex); see also
Zalucki, supra note 24, at 143-44 (noting difficulty courts had in defining sexual
harassment).
28. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
29. See HADLEY & CHUZ, supra note 24, at 4 (noting that D.C. Circuit was first
court of appeals to hold that sexual harassment violated Title VII); see also Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that Barnes made it clear that
"sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII is not limited to disparate treatment founded solely... on gender," but also includes "sex discrimination whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial factor in the discrimination"). As
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted, it is "much too late
in the day to contend that Title VII does not outlaw terms of employment for
women which differ appreciably from those set for men, and which are not genuinely and reasonably related to performance on the job." Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990.
Following the court's opinion in Barnes, the EEOC developed advisory guidelines
for identifying sexual harassment claims. See Zalucki, supra note 24, at 144-45 (noting that although Congress never specifically prohibited sexual harassment when
amending Title VII, EEOC has created guidelines for identifying sexual harassment claims).
30. See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 985-86 (stating facts of case).
31. See id. at 986 (demonstrating that appellant was claiming violation of Title
VII because of sexual harassment by her supervisor). The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendant claiming that the suit did not fall within the
protections afforded by the Title VII prohibition against sex discrimination because the appellant was not claiming that she was discriminated against because
she was a woman. See id. at 990 (explaining that district court denied appellant's
sex discrimination claim because she was alleging sexual harassment rather than
that discrimination was directed at her because she was female).
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tion.3 2 Several years after the D.C. Circuit's landmark decision, the
33
United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson
confirmed the Barnes holding and informed the circuit courts that sexual
harassment indeed violates Title VII if the harassment is "sufficiently severe 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an

32. See id. at 990-91 (concluding Title VII was not limited to conditions of
employment based solely upon employee's gender, but included situations where
gender was factor contributing substantially to underlying discrimination and ultimately concluding that sexual harassment claims are gender-based and violative of
Title VII). The court explained that sexual harassment is based on gender because
the employer requests sexual favors simply because the employee is a woman. See
id. at 990 (demonstrating sexual harassment is gender-based because employee
would not have been harassed if she were male).
Following its decision in Barnes, the D.C. Circuit made another landmark decision in Bundy v. Jackson. See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 934 (extending Barnes decision to
hostile work environment context). Bundy was the first case to recognize a Title
VII violation for hostile work environment sexual harassment. See id. at 943-44
(relying on cases finding Title VII violations where employer created or condoned
substantially discriminatory work environment, held discrimination against employer on basis of sex amounted to sex discrimination with respect to "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"); see also Zalucki, supra note 24, at 149
(recognizing Bundy was first case to recognize a claim of sexually hostile work environment). In Bundy, the employee did not allege a loss of a tangible job benefit.
See id. at 149 (noting differences between Bundy and quid pro quo sexual harassment cases). Instead, she alleged sexually charged and intimidating insults, such
as requests by her supervisors to start sexual relationships with them and telling
her "any man in his right mind would want to rape you." Bundy, 641 F.2d at 93941. She further alleged that this conduct affected her work environment and
caused her anxiety and debilitation. See id. (explaining employee received several
sexually charged propositions from her employers and these propositions began to
intertwine directly with her employment). Quoting the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's statement that "Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of
such nefarious activities," the D.C. Circuit concluded that Title VII was not limited
to tangible benefits but also includes intangible benefits. Id. at 944 (quoting Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that in ethnic discriminatory environment cases, Title VII protection must extend to intangible fringe benefits to prevent potential misuse of such benefits for discriminatory purposes)).
Thus, the D.C. Circuit recognized the employee's claim and held that "conditions
of employment [that Title VII is designed to protect from discriminatory practices]
include the psychological and emotional work environment." Id. The D.C. Circuit
rationalized that if Title VII protection is not extended to include "discriminatory
environments" the employer could sexually harass its employees as long as the
employer stopped short of taking any tangible actions against the employee. See id.
at 945 (noting laws that allow women "to prove that resistance to harassment cost
her her job or some other economic benefit are of little help to women fighting
sexual harassment if employers stop short of such tangible actions"). Following
the D.C. Circuit's lead, in 1986 the United States Supreme Court recognized the
hostile work environment claim as a form of sexual harassment under Title VII.
See Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (acknowledging that
hostile work environment is form of sexual harassment). For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's ruling, see infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
33. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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abusive work environment.' 34 In so holding, the Court granted employees the right to bring a Title VII sex-based discrimination claim whether
the claim was based on gender or based on sex and regardless of whether
35
the harassment resulted in a loss of tangible benefits.
34. Id. at 65. In Vinson, a female employee brought a sexual harassment suit
against her employer under Title VII. See id. at 60. Specifically, the employee alleged that her employer fondled her, exposed himself to her, followed her into the
ladies room and forcibly raped her on several occasions. See id. (describing harassment). Relying on guidelines adopted by the EEOC that classify sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination, the Court concluded that sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title VII if the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive as
to adversely alter the victim's employment. See id. at 66-67 (noting plaintiff may
establish violation of Title VII by showing discrimination based on sex has created
hostile work environment). In support of the holding, the Court quoted the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's powerful statement comparing sexual harassment with racial harassment:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as
demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
The EEOC guidelines that the Court relied on were released in 1980 following
the Barnes decision. See id. at 65 (discussing EEOC guidelines). The Court, though
recognizing that the guidelines are not controlling on the courts, argued that they
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment that courts could use for
guidance. See id. (recognizing that EEOC guidelines are persuasive authority in
sexual discrimination claims under Title VII and can be used by courts to identify
actionable sexual harassment claims). According to the guidelines, "[u] nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of
a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment," whether or not such conduct is directly linked to the grant or denial of an economic benefit. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)
(1985); accord Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (noting claim for sexual harassment exists
even if sexual harassment does not result in loss of economic benefits). Thus, the
EEOC guidelines broadly define sexual harassment and require that the harassing
behavior affect the individual's employment either by interfering with or influencing the economic benefits of the employee's employment or by interfering unreasonably with the employee's work performance, thus creating an offensive or
hostile work environment. See Zalucki, supra note 24, at 152 (analyzing EEOC
guidelines).
35. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63-68 (concluding victim of sexual harassment can
bring valid sexual discrimination claim under Title VII whether conduct was based
on sex or gender).
Currently, there are two types of actionable sexual harassment claims: the
quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and the hostile work environment claim.
See Zalucki, supra note 24, at 145 (noting two forms of actionable sexual harassment claims). According to the EEOC, quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs in
two different situations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (establishing actionable claims
for sexual harassment). First, there is quid pro quo sexual harassment when "submission to... conduct [of a sexual nature] is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment." Id. Second, quid pro quo sexual harassment also occurs when "submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual."
Id. Thus, in quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employer solicits sexual favors or
otherwise harasses the employee in exchange for a tangible work or economic ben-
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659

Sexual Harassment in the Third Circuit,

Conforming to the Supreme Court's holding in Vinson, the Third Circuit has classified sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination that
violates Title VII. 3 6 In the Third Circuit there are two actionable claims
for sexual harassment under Title VII-quid pro quo sexual harassment
and hostile work environment sexual harassment. 37 Quid pro quo sexual
harassment is conduct of a sexual nature when "submission to such conduct is made.., a term or condition of an individual's employment [or]
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." 38 As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained in Robinson
v. City of Pittsburgh,39 a plaintiff will succeed in a quid pro quo claim only if
efit. See Zalucki, supra note 24, at 149 (describing nature of quid pro quo sexual
harassment claim). Quid pro quo sexual harassment is generally fairly noticeable.
See id.at 149 n.10 (explaining quid pro quo exchange may be explicit exchange
such as, "Ifyou won't sleep with me, you won't get your promotion," or implicit

exchange such as, "If you want the job, you have to do something 'nice' for me").
On the other hand, under the EEOC guidelines a hostile work environment
claim arises when "such conduct [of a sexual nature] has the purpose or effect of

unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
Unlike the quid pro quo sexual harassment claim that requires the plaintiff to
show a loss of economic benefit as a result of the plaintiffs refusal to give in to the
sexual advances of the employer, the hostile work environment claim is not characterized by the loss of an economic benefit. See Zalucki, supra note 24, at 145 (noting hostile work environment claim is "more subtle"). A hostile work environment
claim arises from conduct of a sexual nature based on either sex or gender. See id.
(noting hostile work environment claim can be based on either sex or gender). A
claim based on sex "involves conduct of a sexual nature, such as unwelcome touch,
leering, innuendoes, crude jokes, or the display of explicit pictures." Id. Although
there are different views as to what constitutes an "unwelcome touch," it is generally considered to include fondling, pinching, or brushing against another's body.
See id. at 145 n.13 (defining unwelcome touch). On the other hand, a claim based
on gender "involves conduct that is non-sexual, and detrimental to a woman as a
member of a protected class." Id. at 145. Thus, claims based on gender involve
conduct directed at aspects of identity or behavior related to stereotypes both of
the different gender and their roles in society. See id. at 145 n.12 (defining gender
and sex, explaining that sex is "reserved for anatomical identity, based on genitalia
and physical secondary sex characteristics... [whereas] [t] he term gender is used
to indicate aspects of identity of behavior related to both perception of self and
social roles" (citations omitted)).
For a discussion of the arguments suggesting the distinctions between the
quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims should be eliminated, see Barbara Verdonik, Comment, Abolishing the Quid Pro Quo and Work EnvironmentDistinctions in Sexual Harassment Cases Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Vinson v. Taylor,
60

ST. JOHN'S

L. Riv. 177 (1985).

36. See generally Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1297-99 (3d Cir.
1997) (recognizing plaintiff may establish actionable claim under Title VII for sexual harassment).
37. See id. at 1296-97 (noting plaintiff can allege either quid pro quo sexual
harassment or hostile work environment sexual harassment under Tide VII).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
39. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
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the employee establishes that the "submission to [verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature] is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of [his or her] employment [or] submission to or rejection of
such conduct ...

is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting

[his or her employment]. 140 Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that
the consequences attached to his or her response to the sexual advances
alters his or her "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or "deprive[s] or tend[s] to deprive [him or her] of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect[s] [his or her] status as an employee." 4 1 As a result, it is not enough for the employer to engage in objectionable conduct; rather, the conduct must be severe enough to alter
an employee's terms, conditions or privileges of employment in order for
the plaintiff to have an actionable quid pro quo claim for sexual discrimination. 42 In addition, the plaintiff only has a valid claim for quid pro quo
40. Id. at 1296 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)-(2) (codifying guidelines
adopted by EEOC for establishing quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under
Tide VII)). Prior to 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
did not have an occasion to consider the elements of a quid pro quo claim. See id.
(noting its issue of first impression). When finally faced with such an issue, the

court in Robinson chose to adopt the guidelines formulated by the EEOC. See id.
(noting circuit's adoption of EEOC guidelines). The EEOC guidelines are codified as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment [or] (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1)-(2).
As the Third Circuit explained, under the federal regulations, a quid pro quo
violation occurs the instant the employee is informed that his or her terms or
conditions of employment (i.e., compensation) is dependent on his or her submission to the sexual advances. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1297 (explaining that subsection (1) of C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) covers situations where employee is told before
adverse employment decision that his or her response to sexual advances will affect
terms, conditions or privileges of his or her employment). A violation occurs even
if the employee submits to the sexual advances, or if employee rebuffs the sexual
advances and the employer does not follow through on his threat. See id. (noting
threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment and is irrelevant whether employees' employment is actually affected by threat). In contrast, the Robinson court

explained that under the federal regulations a quid pro quo violation does not
occur until the plaintiff establishes that his or her response to the sexual advances
was subsequently used as a basis for a decision about the terms or conditions of his
or her employment. See id. (explaining subsection (2) of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
covers situations where employee's response to sexual advances is later used as
basis for employment decision). For a further discussion of the EEOC guidelines,
see infra note 46.
41. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1296-97 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2)
(1994)).
42. See id. at 1297 (noting that not all objectionable conduct attributable to

employer is sufficient to violate Title VII). The court points out that once the
plaintiff establishes that verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitutes
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sexual harassment if the harasser had the actual or apparent authority to
43
carry out the offer or threat that was made.
In addition to establishing a violation of Title VII by proving a claim
of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the Third Circuit also allows the plaintiff to establish a violation of Title VII by proving that sexual harassment
44
To succeed in a sexual
created a hostile or abusive work environment.
harassment claim based on a hostile work environment, the plaintiff must
establish five elements that were adopted by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Kunin v. Sears Roebuck Co.45 These elements are:
(1) [plaintiff] suffered intentional discrimination because of [his
or her] sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3)
the discrimination detrimentally affected [plaintiff]; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of
the same sex in that position; and (5) the existence of respon46
deat superior liability.
sexual harassment, the plaintiff must also show that the conduct was severe enough
to violate Tide VII. See id. at 1296-97 (discussing how plaintiff establishes his or her
claim of sexual harassment). Under Tide VII, conduct of a sexual nature constitutes an unlawful employment practice when the employer:
(1) ...discriminate[s] against any (2) individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's ... sex ...; or (3) . . . limit[s], segregate[s], or classif[ies] his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to

deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's...
sex ....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
43. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1296 n.9 (noting employer is liable for quid pro
quo sexual harassment by supervisor having actual or apparent authority); see also
Craig v. Y&Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding quid pro quo
sexual harassment when supervisor with plenary authority dismissed plaintiff for
refusing supervisor's sexual advances); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
568 F.2d 1044, 104849 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding quid pro quo sexual harassment
when supervisor responsible for evaluating plaintiff told her he expected her to
have sexual relations with him).
44. See Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 293 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining second actionable claim for sexual discrimination under Tide VII).
45. 175 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 1999).
46. Id. The EEOC has also established guidelines for hostile work environment sexual harassment. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985) (setting forth
guidelines for proving Title VII sex discrimination claim based on hostile work
environment). According to the EEOC, "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature constitutes sexual harassment when ... such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creatId.
ing an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
§ 1604.11 (a) (3). Similar to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's requirement of respondeat superior liability, the EEOC also only holds an
employer liable for sexual harassment between fellow employees if "the employer
knows or should have known of the conduct, [and the employer did not take]
immediate and appropriate corrective action." See id. § 1604.11(d).
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In order to establish the existence of respondeat superior liability, the
plaintiff must prove that the employer knew or should have known of the
47
harassment but failed to take prompt remedial action.
III.

JUSTICIABLE CASES: THE REQUIREMENT

THAT PLAINTIFFS HAVE

STANDING TO BRING SUIT

Unfortunately, despite Congress' attempt to eliminate sex discrimination by enacting Title VII, it is still prevalent in the workplace. 48 Arguably,
sex discrimination continues to exist in the workplace because employers
are not deterred from discriminating on the basis of sex because the employer knows that the female employee is unlikely to bring suit for fear of
retaliation, and the male employee is unable to bring suit.49 Although
both men and women are able to file suit for sex discrimination under
Title VII, courts are reluctant to grant men standing in a sex discrimination case when, although both men and women were injured, the discrimination was directed only at women. 50 Fundamentally, when a male
plaintiff is denied standing, he is unable to maintain the suit in any of the
courts of the United States. 51 To establish standing in a case before a
47. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990)
(explaining how plaintiff in hostile work environment sexual harassment claim establishes respondeat superior liability element); see also Kunin, 175 F.3d at 293
(noting employer is not always liable for hostile work environment).
48. See Zalucki, supra note 24, at 144 (noting sexual harassment is still prevalent in workplace).
49. See N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding
Male Standing to Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of Employer DiscriminationAgainst
Females, 64 WASH. L. REv. 365, 365-67 (1989) (noting females are less likely than
males to file suit and that federal circuits are split as to whether to give male employees, injured by discrimination, standing when discrimination is targeted only
at female employees). According to recent empirical studies, women are less inclined than men to file suit when faced with discriminatory practices. See id.at 367
(noting men are more likely to file suit claiming discrimination). It has been suggested that women either totally ignore the sex discrimination or avoid filing suit
for sex discrimination because they fear they will be retaliated against if they complain. See Zalucki, supra note 24, at n.3 (stating women may ignore problem or
refuse to address problem for fear of possible repercussions from complaint of
sexual harassment). Female victims of sex discrimination "express fears that [if
they complain] they instead will be blamed, that they will be considered 'unprofessional,' or 'asking for it,' or told that this problem is too petty or trivial for a grown
woman to worry about, and that they are blowing it all out of proportion." Id.
(citing CATHERINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION 49 (1979)).

50. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 365 (noting both men and women are able to
seek redress for sex discrimination under Title VII; however, men are not always
granted standing to sue for sex discrimination when discrimination is directed
only at women).
51. See, e.g.,
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1981) ("Those who do not possess
Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts of the United States.");
Eric J. Kuhn, Standing: Stood Up at the Courthouse Door, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 886,
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federal court, the plaintiff must satisfy constitutional requirements as well
52
as any judicially created prudential limitations.
A. Article III of the Constitution: ConstitutionalRequirements of Standing
Article III of the Constitution states that "the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity ....
[and] to Controversies." 53 To
satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, the plaintiff
54
must establish that he or she has standing to bring the suit in question.
To establish constitutional standing, Article III requires that the party
seeking to bring suit must show "at an irreducible minimum... 'that [he
or she] personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant,' and that the injury
'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be redressed
55
by a favorable decision.'
The first Article III element requires that the plaintiff show that he or
she has suffered an injury in fact. 56 To satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has a direct stake in the litigation by
showing either that he or she has suffered some direct economic injury or
some non-economic, tangible injury. 57 For instance, the United States Su886 (1996) (noting federal courts will "dismiss even the most meritorious claim if a
party lacks standing").
52. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 886-87 (noting plaintiff is denied standing if he
does not meet constitutional requirements of standing as well as prudential limitations). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing, by showing he suffered an injury in fact, namely, "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical."' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1991). The
Court explained that "particularized" means "that the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Id. at 560 n.1.
53. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
54. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 887 n.3 (noting standing is one of several "case
or controversy" requirements). The question of standing is "whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute." Id. at 887 n.2 (citation
omitted). The other "case or controversy" requirements include: ripeness, mootness, advisory opinions and political questions. See id. at 887 n.3 (noting other
"case or controversy" requirements).
55. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472 (citations omitted).
56. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 891-92 (noting first element of standing requires plaintiff to show that he or she suffered injury in fact).
57. See id. at 891-92 (noting injury in fact requirement can be satisfied by
showing either economic injury or some less tangible injury); see also United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973)
(holding standing was not limited to plaintiffs showing economic harm). The
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatoiy
Agency Procedures, explained the purpose behind requiring that the plaintiff have

an injury in fact:
"Injury in fact" reflects the statutory requirement that a person be "adversely affected" or "aggrieved," and it serves to distinguish a person with
a direct stake in the outcome of the litigation--even though small-from a
person with a mere interest in the problem . . . . "The basic idea ... is
that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of
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preme Court has recognized standing where the plaintiff has claimed an
aesthetic, environmental, recreational or social injury. 58 Courts deny
standing, however, if the alleged injury is merely abstract, speculative or
59
not particularized.
The second Article III element, causation, requires that there be a
causal connection between the injury and the action that the plaintiff is
asking the court to adjudicate. 60 Specifically, the injury must be "fairly...
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant."6 1 Thus, if the injury is too "attenuated" and not "fairly traceable" to the defendant's con62
duct, the court will not recognize standing.
The final Article III element, redressability, requires that the plaintiffs injury be redressable by a favorable decision. 63 The United States
Supreme Court has fluctuated as to the degree of specificity required to
fulfill this element. 64 On some occasions, the Court has required the
plaintiff to show that "the injury will 'likely' be redressed if the requested
relief is granted." 65 At other times, the Court has required the plaintiff to
principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the
motivation."
Id. at 891 n.14 (citations omitted).
58. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 892 (stating Supreme Court has granted standing where the alleged injury is non-economic (citing Virginia v. American Booksellers
Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (noting that plaintiff facing possible criminal
prosecution may have standing to challenge criminal statute)); Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (concluding environmental group has standing due
to alleged injury of recreational interests); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 102-04 (1979) (concluding plaintiffs claiming social injuries resulting
from discriminatory housing practices had standing); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74 (1978) (determining that aesthetic and

environmental interests are sufficient to grant plaintiff standing); Students Challeng-

ing Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. at 688-90 (concluding alleged environmental injury is sufficient to establish standing to sue as persons "adversely
affected" or "aggrieved")).
59. See Kuhn, supranote 51, at 892 (setting forth situations where standing has
been denied). The Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, stated that "some day"
intentions, without any description of concrete plans, are too speculative, and
therefore fail to support the "actual or imminent injury" element. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1991) (recognizing plaintiff must demonstrate actual or imminent injury in order for standing to be recognized).
60. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 473 (recognizing causal element of Article III standing doctrine).
61. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
62. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984) (failing to recognize
standing, claiming "relationship between the IRS's grant of tax exemptions and
the schools' conduct was 'attenuated at best'").
63. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (noting redressability requirement of standing).
The plaintiffs injury is redressable if a favorable decision will remove or remedy
the injury. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 893 (recognizing injury must be redressable
by favorable judicial decision before court will recognize standing).
64. See Kuhn, supranote 51, at 893 (noting Court has applied different tests to
determine redressability).
65. Id.
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show that a "substantial likelihood exists that her injury will be remedied
through a favorable decision." 66 No matter which standard the Court follows, it will never speculate on whether the plaintiff's injury would be rem67
edied by a favorable decision.
B.

PrudentialLimitations to Article III Standing Requirements

In addition to Article III constitutional requirements, the plaintiff
may need to satisfy a set of judicially imposed prudential limitations. 68
The United States Supreme Court has refused to recognize standing
where: (1) the plaintiff is asserting the legal rights or interests of another;
(2) the case involves "abstract questions of wide public significance which
amount to 'generalized grievances' pervasively shared;" and (3) the complaints do not fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the challenged legislation. 69 Because the prudential limitations are not rooted in
66. Id.

67. See id. (explaining Court will not speculate on whether injury is
redressable); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (holding it must be "'likely,' as opposed

to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision"').
68. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 894 (noting plaintiff may need to satisfy prudential requirements to have standing to bring suit).
69. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 371 (describing prudential limitations to
standing imposed by United States Supreme Court) (citations omitted). Courts
have enacted these prudential limitations "to 'avoid deciding questions of broad
social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to
the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."' Kuhn,
supra note 51, at 894 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
99-100 (1979) (granting standing to plaintiff challenging discriminatory housing
practices under Title VIII, which grants standing to any person aggrieved)).
Under the first prudential limitation, the courts have refused to confer standing on an individual attempting to assertjus tertii, or the legal rights or interests of
another. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 371 (noting courts do not recognize thirdparty standing). In a limited exception, however, the courts have recognized
standing when an association attempts to bring an action on behalf of its member.
See Kuhn, supranote 51, at 894 (noting courts grant third-party standing in limited
circumstances). The Court has recognized such third-party standing if and only if
the following three conditions are met: "(1) a member of the organization would
have had standing as an individual; (2) the alleged interests are germane to the
association's purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the presence of an individual member." Id.
Under the second prudential limitation, the court will not confer standing on
an individual merely asserting a generalized grievance. See id. at 895 (noting
courts are reluctant to hear generalized grievances). Generalized grievances are
"'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized
grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 465 U.S. 464, 475 (1981) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975)); accord Lujan, 54 U.S. at 574 (stating private citizen does
not have standing to file suit when "plaintiff has [asserted] only the right, possessed by every citizen" (citing Fairchildv. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129-30 (1922))).
In determining whether the plaintiff has standing, the court must be careful to
distinguish between a plaintiff who is merely seeking relief for a generalized grievance and a plaintiff who is seeking relief for an injury that has also been suffered
by many other individuals. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 895 (noting "Court's refusal
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the Constitution, Congress has wide latitude to override the judicially imposed prudential standing requirements and bestow standing on any 70indiIf
vidual meeting the minimum constitutional standing requirements.
Congress has not exercised this power to override the prudential limitations by enacting legislation that restores standing to the full extent permitted by Article III, however, then the plaintiff must satisfy both the
71
constitutional and the prudential standing requirements.
C.

Standing in The Third Circuit

In Powell v. Ridge,72 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit set forth its standing requirements. 73 The Third Circuit began by
explaining that in order to have standing, the plaintiff must meet the basic
Article III requirements; therefore, the plaintiff must show "(1) an actual
injury that is (2) causally connected to the conduct complained of and (3)
likely to be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' 74 Furthermore, the Third
to serve 'as a forum in which to air .. .generalized grievances' should be distinguished from situations in which a large group of people share the same injury"
(citing Flastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968))). The United States Supreme Court
has stated that although standing is denied to individuals seeking relief for a generalized grievance, standing will not be denied to an individual who has in fact
suffered an injury even though many people also suffer from the same injury. See
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 687-88 (1973) (refusing to deny standing to individuals suffering same injury
as many other individuals, reasoning that "[t]o deny standing to persons who are
in fact injured simply because many others are injured, would mean that the most
injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody").
The final prudential limitation imposed by the court is the zone of interest
test. See Kuhn, supra note 51, at 895 (noting plaintiff must also satisfy the zone of
interest test to have standing to sue). To satisfy this element, the "interest sought
to be protected by the complainant . . . [must be] arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1969). To satisfy this test, the plaintiff must make an affirmative showing that he
was an "intended beneficiary of Congress's statute." Kuhn, supra note 51, at 895.
70. See Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination Testing: Theories of Standing
and a Reply to Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 1, 9 (1994) (recognizing
Congress can require courts to disregard prudential limitations); Jordan, supra
note 21, at 141 (noting Congress may confer standing on any plaintiff meeting
constitutional standing requirements even if prudential standing requirements are
not met); Torrey, supra note 49, at 371 (same). Congress can enact legislation that
restores standing to the full extent permitted by Article III either "explicitly" in a
statutory provision conferring a private cause of action or "implicitly" by granting
standing to any person "claiming to be aggrieved." SeeJordan, supra note 21, at
141 (noting that Congress may overrule court-imposed prudential limitations).
71. See Jordan, supra note 21, at 141 (explaining plaintiff must satisfy both
prudential and constitutional limitations if Congress has not legislatively overruled
prudential limitations).
72. 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999).
73. See id. at 403-05 (stating United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit's interpretation of standing).
74. Id. at 403 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (establishing test that must be
satisfied for plaintiff to have standing)). Following Supreme Court precedent, the
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Circuit explained that the plaintiff might also need to meet the prudential
standing requirements. 75 Congress may, however, legislatively direct that
standing under a particular act be limited only by Article III requirements. 76 When Congress drafts such legislation, the Third Circuit believes
plaintiffs are free to disregard the court-imposed prudential limitations
and "seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others,
77
and ... may invoke the general public interest" to support their claim.

D.

Standing Requirements in Title VI Cases

Section 706(b) of Title VII grants individuals a private right of action
against his or her employer for alleged discrimination in employment. 78
As in all other cases brought in the courts in the United States, the plaintiff must have standing in order to bring the Title VII claim against his or
her employer. To have standing to bring such a suit, Title VII requires
that the plaintiff is a "person claiming to be aggrieved. " 79 Title VII does
court explained that the injury must consist of "an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical." Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (explaining test
plaintiff must satisfy to have requisite injury)).
75. See id. at 404 (explaining courts require plaintiffs to satisfy certain prudential limitations in effort "to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where
no individual rights would be vindicated"). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has adopted the zone of interest limitation, and takes the
view that standing is designed to ensure that the "interest sought to be protected
by the [plaintiff] is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute in question." Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d
90, 94 (3d Cir. 1972) (quoting Association of Data ProcessingServ. Org. v. Camp 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1969) (explaining zone of interest test)).
76. See Rosen, 477 F.2d at 94 (noting that in certain instances Congress directs
courts to disregard prudential limitations when determining whether plaintiff has
standing to sue).
77. Fair Housing Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 75 (3d
Cir. 1998).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994) (granting power to "a person claiming
to be aggrieved" to file charges "alleging that an employer ... has engaged in an
unlawful employment practice"). Under Title VII, "a person claiming to be aggrieved" can file charges with the EEOC and, after the proceedings by the EEOC
have continued for a certain period of time, the person may file suit. See id.
§ 2000e-5(b) & (e) (noting aggrieved person must first file charges with EEOC and
if after 180 days from filing of such charge EEOC has not filed civil action, then
aggrieved person may file suit).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Before an individual may bring a Title VII claim,
he or she must meet the statutory requirements and constitutional standing requirements. SeeJacobson, supra note 22, at 105 (noting plaintiff must have standing to bring Title VII claim). As for the statutory requirements, the individual
must be a "person claiming to be aggrieved." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). In addition,
the individual must meet the statute's procedural requirements, which include filing a timely charge with the EEOC after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred and filing a timely action after receiving a notice of right to sue. See id.
§ 2000e-5(b) & (e) (stating statutory requirements for standing in Title VII suit);
see a/soJacobson, supra note 22, at 105 (discussing Title VII procedural requirements that employee must satisfy in order to have standing).
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not define "a person claiming to be aggrieved," and the courts have struggled to define the term for themselves. 80 The circuit courts have typically
interpreted the "person claiming to be aggrieved" requirement broadly in
direct discrimination cases in order to grant standing to the fullest extent
permissible under Article 111.81 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Hackett v. McGuire Brothers8 2 exemplified the circuits'
broad approach to standing when it stated that "[a] n aggrieved person...
[under Title VII] is any person aggrieved by any of the forbidden practices." 83 The courts disagree, however, regarding how broadly8 4to define
standing when the plaintiff is claiming indirect discrimination.
1.

How the Courts of Appeals Define Standing in Title VII Cases Where a
White Employee Is Seeking Redress for DiscriminationAgainst a
Minority Employee

The circuit courts that have dealt with this issue unanimously agree
that a white employee has standing to protest alleged racial discrimination
against non-white employees by the employer. 85 For instance, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Waters v. Heublein86

granted a white woman standing to sue to enjoin racial discrimination
against Black and Hispanic-American employees. 8 7 According to the
80. SeeJordan, supra note 21, at 137 (noting courts have struggled to define
"persons aggrieved").
81. See Title VI-Standing-FourthCircuit Denies Standing to White Men Advancing Claim of Hostile Environment Due to DiscriminationAgainst Co-Workers----Childress v.
City of Richmond, 112 HARv. L. REv. 725, 725 (1999) (recognizing that courts
interpret "person claiming to be aggrieved" broadly to grant standing to fullest
extent permissible under Title VII). Direct discrimination occurs when the person
claiming to be aggrieved was the target of the discrimination. See Torrey, supra
note 49, at 365 (noting both men and women have standing to seek redress under
Title VII for injuries they suffer because of direct discrimination).
82. 445 F.3d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
83. Id. at 445 (holding that if plaintiff was discriminated against based on race
then he is aggrieved).
84. See Torrey, supra note 49, at 365 (noting circuit split). Indirect discrimination is "discrimination directed towards one group that indirectly injures a person
not a member of that group." Mary-Alice Brady, Note, White Males Have Standing to
Bring Hostile Environment Claimsfor DiscriminationDirected Towards Black and Female
Coworkers: Childress v. City of Richmond, 39 B.C. L. REv. 423, 423 n.6 (1998) (citing Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (recognizing white
employee's standing to sue for discrimination towards minority co-workers)).
85. For a further discussion of the courts that have granted white plaintiffs
standing to sue for discrimination towards minorities, see infra notes 86 -112 and
accompanying text.
86. 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976).
87. See id. at 469 (holding white employee has standing to sue to enjoin discrimination against Black and Hispanic-American employees). In this case, the
employee filed an action under Title VII alleging that her employers engaged in
discriminatory employment practices against women, Blacks and Spanish-surnamed Americans. See id. at 467. Specifically, she claimed women and minorities
were discriminated against by being hired in "low-pay and low-status work compared to men." Id.
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court, the employee had standing to sue for racial discrimination aimed at
minority employees because the term "person aggrieved" includes persons
who are injured by the loss of important benefits from interracial associations.88 In support of their conclusion that the white employee had standing to sue for racial discrimination aimed at minority employees, the court
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.89
In Trafficante, a white tenant brought suit against an apartment complex under Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act ("Title VIII") in an attempt
to end racially discriminatory rental polices aimed at non-whites.90 The
Supreme Court granted the white tenants standing to sue and held that
standing is recognized in all tenants in a housing complex who are injured
by racial discrimination in the management of the housing facilities. 9 1 Relying on the Third Circuit's decision in Hackett, the Court concluded that
the words used in Title VIII to define a "person aggrieved" show "a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article
III of the Constitution." 92 Therefore, the Court concluded the white tenants qualify as "persons aggrieved" by the discriminatory practices because the exclusion of minority persons from the housing complex
interferes with the "benefits [they would have received] from interracial
associations."9 3 As a result, the white tenants had standing because, although not the direct objects of the discrimination, they too suffered from
the racial discrimination. 9 4 Believing that the scope of Title VII and Title
VIII were comparable, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
Waters was "logically indistinguishable" from Trafficante and applied the

88. See id. (granting employee standing to sue to redress racial and ethnic
discrimination).
89. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
90. See id. at 206-07.
91. See id. at 212 (granting tenants in housing units alleging indirect discrimination standing to sue).
92. Id. For a discussion of Hackett, see infra notes 159-64 and accompanying
text. Title VIII defines an "aggrieved person" as "any person who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (1) (1994).
According to the United States Supreme Court, this "broad and inclusive language" granted standing to tenants of the housing unit that was charged with discrimination because those tenants "who were not the direct objects of
discrimination [also] had an interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too suffered." Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10. The Court argued that granting standing to
individuals, who claim discriminatory housing practices "affects 'the very quality of
their daily lives,"' and furthers the purpose of Title VIII. See id. at 211 (noting Title
VIII will not effectively eliminate discrimination in housing practices if all individuals suffering from discriminatory practices are not granted potential redress).
93. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209-10.
94. See id. at 210 (recognizing indirect racial discrimination in housing
practices).
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Supreme Court's rationale to the Title VII case, granting white individuals
"aggrieved" status in race discrimination cases. 95
Shortly after the Waters decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reached a similar decision in EEOC v. Bailey CO. 9 6 In
Bailey, a white employee protested racially discriminatory hiring practices
by her employer that affected black employees. 97 The Sixth Circuit concluded that Trafficante requires the courts to give a broad interpretation to
the language "a person claiming to be aggrieved."9 8 Specifically, the Sixth
Circuit held that white employees who may suffer from the lack of association with minorities at work have standing to seek redress for racial discrimination aimed at non-white employees. 99 Comparing the statutory
95. See Waters v. Heublin, 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976) (applying
holding from Trafficante and concluding that white individuals have standing to
sue for racially discriminatory practices aimed at minorities). In support of its
holding, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained:
[I] nterpersonal contacts between members of the same or different races
are no less a part of the work environment than of the home environment. Indeed, in modem America, a person is as likely, and often more
likely to know his fellow workers than the tenants next door or down the
hall. The possibilities of advantageous personal, professional, or business
contacts are certainly as great at work as at home. The benefits of interracial harmony are as great in either locale.
Id. at 469.
The court believed that the scope of Title VII and Title VIII were comparable
because both Acts were intended to end discriminatory practices. See id. (rejecting
lower court's conclusion that Title VII's scope was narrower than scope of Title
VIII). The court explained that Title VII attempts to end discrimination in the
workplace by providing equal opportunities to all employees, whereas Title VIII
attempts to end discrimination in housing practices by forbidding segregation. See
id. (noting congressional intent for enacting Title VII and Title VIII). The Ninth
Circuit concluded by explaining that "[t] he distinction between laws aimed at desegregation and laws aimed at equal opportunity is illusory. These goals are opposite sides of the same coin." Id.
96. 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977).
97. See id. at 442. In this case, the employee alleged her employer "failed 'to
promote females to supervisory positions because of their sex,' that the company
failed 'to pay equally qualified females the same wages as males,' and that the
company failed 'to recruit and hire Negro females because of their race."' Id. After concluding the employer was not guilty of sex discrimination, the EEOC
dropped the employee's sex discrimination claims but eventually brought suit alleging racial discrimination. See id. The employee sought to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the employee did not have standing because the
discrimination was not directed at her. See id. at 446 (explaining employer's
argument).
98. See id. at 452 (stating that court would be inclined to agree with employer's argument that employee did not have standing if Supreme Court holding
in Trafficante were not controlling authority). For a discussion of why the Sixth
Circuit felt compelled to follow Trafficante, see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
99. See Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453 (granting white employees standing in indirect
discrimination cases). The Sixth Circuit explained that there were several reasons
that required them to follow Trafficante's lead and grant white employees standing
in indirect discrimination cases. See id. (noting several reasons why Trafficante requires holding that white employees who may have suffered from loss of benefits
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from lack of association with racial minorities at work have standing in Title VII
cases). First, the court argued that because both Title VII and Title VIII use the
language "a person aggrieved" to define who has standing to sue, and because
both acts are civil rights acts, it must be presumed that Congress intended the
similar language to have the same meanings. See id. at 452-53 (concluding similar
language in Title VII and Tide VIII suggests congressional intent to give such similar language same construction). Thus, because Trafficante construed the definition of "a person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VIII as granting standing to any
individual claiming to be injured by discriminatory purposes regardless of whether
the charging party is a member of the group discriminated against, the Sixth Circuit concluded the same broad definition had to be applied in Title VII cases. See
id. (following Trafficante and broadly defining standing in Title VII cases); see also
Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1989) (adopting
broad definition of "person aggrieved" and concluding white individuals may have
standing to raise claim of racial discrimination even when discrimination was
aimed at minorities); Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 848-50 (7th Cir. 1982)
(same); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1980) (same);
Waters, 547 F.2d at 469 (same).
Second, the Sixth Circuit referred to the similarities in the design of the acts
and argued that such similarities further supported the conclusion that Trafficante
must control the issue of standing in discrimination claims under Title VII. See
Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453 (noting similarities in design). Specifically, the Sixth Circuit
noted that beyond the use of the language "person aggrieved," both Acts also include a list of practices deemed discriminatory and both Acts establish similar enforcement procedures. See id. (discussing similarities of Acts). Compare 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3610 (1994) (describing certain practices deemed discriminatory and establishing enforcement procedures to deal with violations of Act), with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-5 (1994) (same). The Sixth Circuit argued that the one difference between the designs, (Title VII authorizes the EEOC to bring public suits to
enforce Title VII, but the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD")
does not have a similar power under Title VIII) is unimportant. See Bailey, 563 F.2d
at 453 (arguing that public enforcement power granted to EEOC but denied HUD
is not sufficient reason to give different meanings to "person aggrieved"); see also
Waters, 547 F.2d at 469 (concluding in significant that EEOC has enforcement powers under Title VII but HUD does not have similar powers under Title VIII). The
Sixth Circuit explained that prior to the 1972 amendment of Title VII, the designs
of Title VII and Tide VIII were identical. See Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453 (reiterating fact
that Title VII and Title VIII are similar). It was not until the 1972 amendment that
the public enforcement power was added to Title VII. See id. (noting changes). By
adding the public enforcement power, Congress intended to expand the coverage
of and increase the compliance with the law, not to narrow the class of individuals
capable of bringing suit. See id. (stating Congress' intent for amending Title VIII
(citing H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 4-5, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2179
(1963))); see also Waters, 547 F.2d at 470 (noting that by amending Title VII, Congress did not intend to narrow class of plaintiffs who might bring suit). As further
support of their decision to follow Trafficante, the Sixth Circuit argued that the
strong similarities between the purposes and effects of Title VII and Title VIII requires it to construe the language "person aggrieved" in the same manner as construed by Trafficante. See Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453-54 (noting both Title VII and Title
VIII were enacted to end discrimination and both affect housing patterns and employment practices, thereby increasing interracial contact); see also Stewart, 675 F.2d
at 848-49 (concluding similarities in purposes of two Acts requires that phrase "a
person claiming to be aggrieved" is interpreted in same manner as Trafficante interpreted term "aggrieved person"); Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 482 (same); Waters,
547 F.2d at 469 (same).
Perhaps the two most important reasons the Sixth Circuit offered for following Trafficante are that the Supreme Court relied on Hackett, a Title VII case con-
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language of Title VII with the statutory language of Tide VIII, which both
confer standing on an individual who is aggrieved, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Congress must have intended such similar language to have
the same meanings. 10 0 Therefore, because the Supreme Court defines
"aggrieved person" under Title VIII as broadly as permitted under Article
III, the Sixth Circuit concluded that standing should also be defined
broadly under Title VII.1 °1
In subsequent years, other circuits joined the Sixth and Ninth Circuits
and granted standing to white employees alleging racial discrimination
when the discrimination was directed at minority workers. 10 2 Moreover,
in following the decisions from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, these courts
10 3
addressed an issue that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits failed to consider.
struing standing in and also that a conclusion consistent with Trafficante is also
consistent with the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII. See Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453
(explaining why Trafficante is controlling precedent). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hackett held that the language "a person claiming
to be aggrieved" indicated congressional intent to define standing under Title VII
as broadly as Article III allows. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d
Cir. 1971) (defining standing broadly thereby requiring plaintiff to satisfy Article
III standing requirements). The Bailey court argued that since Trafficante approved the reasoning of Hackett, the Supreme Court must equate Title VII and
Title VIII on the issue of standing and define standing broadly in suits brought
under each Act. See Bailey, 563 F.2d at 453 (concluding that under both Titles VII
and VIII "a person can be aggrieved from the loss of benefits from the lack of
interracial associations"). This interpretation of the Supreme Court's view of
standing in Title VII is consistent with the EEOC's reading of Title VII. See id. at
453-54 (noting EEOC interpretation of Title VII). Like Trafficante, the EEOC defines standing broadly and confers standing upon any individual "aggrieved" by
discriminatory practices. See id. (noting similarities between Supreme Court's view
of standing and EEOC's view). The EEOC interprets Title VII as granting every
individual "the right to work in an environment free from unlawful discrimination." Id. at 454 (noting EEOC's view of standing under Title VII). Consistent with
this interpretation, the EEOC has continuously held that white employees have
standing to file charges with the EEOC and to sue because of discrimination
against black employees. See id. (noting that although EEOC interpretations are
not controlling, it is important to consider such interpretations when EEOC has
consistently and persuasively interpreted Title VII in same manner).
100. See Bailey, 563 F.2d at 452-53 (concluding that similarities in statutory
language, particularly use of "person claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII and use
of "person aggrieved" in Title VIII, suggests Congress intended both phrases to
have same meaning).
101. See id. (adopting Trafficante's interpretation of standing).
102. See generally Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679-80 (conferring standing to white employee alleging racial discrimination that was aimed at minority employees); Stewart, 675 F.2d at 849-50 (declaring white woman "a person aggrieved" and granting
her standing to sue for racial discrimination against non-whites); Mississippi College,
626 F.2d at 483 (granting white employee standing to file charge asserting racial
discrimination against blacks provided employee meets Article III standing
requirements).
103. Compare Stewart, 675 F.2d at 849-50 (declaring white woman "a person
aggrieved" and granting her standing to sue for racial discrimination against nonwhites even though she did not allege loss of interracial associations), with Bailey,
563 F.2d at 452 (claiming white individual is "a person claiming to be aggrieved"
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In granting standing to white employees to sue for discrimination aimed at
minority employees, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits explained that white employees were entitled to sue for racial discrimination to redress their loss
of important benefits from lack of interracial associations.10 4 The Sixth
and Ninth Circuits never considered, however, whether a white individual
has standing to bring a suit alleging racial discrimination when the discrimination was aimed at racial minorities, and the employee did not al10 5
lege a deprivation of his or her benefits from interracial associations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit answered this
question Stewart v. Hannon .106 In Stewart, the plaintiff alleged racial discrimination against minorities in awarding promotions; she did not, however, allege that the discrimination deprived her of benefits from
interracial associations. 10 7 The Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiff
standing even though she did not allege a loss of interracial associations.' 08 The Seventh Circuit explained that the exclusion of minority
workers from the work environment creates a potentialfor the loss of interracial associations. 10 9 This potential loss is sufficient to confer standing. 110 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit expanded the range of
potential plaintiffs in racial discrimination cases under Title VII. In a comparable case several years later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit further extended the range of possible plaintiffs in Clayton
because "she may have suffered from loss of benefits from the lack of association
with racial minorities at work"), and Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70 (granting white
employee standing to redress racial discrimination aimed at minorities arguing as
support for their conclusion that ability to maintain interpersonal contacts be-

tween members of different races is vital to work environment).
104. For a further discussion of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' view that white
employees are entitled to sue for racial discrimination to redress their loss of important benefits from lack of interracial associations, see supranotes 85-88, 96-100
and accompanying text.
105. For a further discussion of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' holdings, see
supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
106. 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982).
107. See id. at 847-48 (stating facts of case).
108. See id. at 849-50 (granting standing to white plaintiff to sue for racial
discrimination aimed at minority employees).
109. See id. at 850 (noting exclusion of racial minorities can lead to loss of
interracial minorities).
110. See id. (concluding specific injury need not be pled to confer standing
and holding that complaint alleging that plaintiff worked in environment subject
to racial discrimination is sufficient to confer standing); see also Clayton v. White
Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1989) (quoting Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir. 1970), which granted white employee
standing to sue for racial discrimination aimed at minority workers, basing its decision on idea that white employee's interest in work environments free of racial
discrimination is within zone of interest protected by Tide VII); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1980) (granting white employee standing

to sue for racial discrimination aimed at minority employees, basing decision on
idea that white employee may seek redress for violations of his or "her own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination").
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v. White Hall School District.111 The Eighth Circuit concluded that white
employees have standing to sue for racial discrimination because their interest in working in an environment free of racial discrimination is within
the zone of interests protected by Title VII, specifically "to eliminate the
112
inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of racial discrimination."
2.

How the Circuits' View of StandingDiffers When a Male Employee Is
Seeking Redress for Sex DiscriminationDirected at Female Employees

The circuit courts have not been as prepared to define standing
broadly when a case deals with a male employee seeking to enjoin sex
discrimination aimed at female employees. 1i 3 For example, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to extend the broad
definition of standing granted to white employees in race discrimination
cases to male employees seeking to redress sex discrimination in Patee v.
Pacific Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.114 According to the Ninth Circuit,
115
male employees cannot assert the rights of their female associates.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that standing will not be recognized unless the male employee claims that he was directly discrimi116
nated against because he is a male.
111. 875 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1989).
112. Id. at 679-80.
113. For a further discussion of the circuits' reluctance to grant standing to a
male suing for sex discrimination aimed at his female co-workers, see infra notes
114-27 and accompanying text.
114. 803 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
view on standing in Title VII claims based on racial discrimination, see supra notes
85-95 and accompanying text.
115. See id. at 478 (stating that men cannot assert rights of their female coworkers to be free from discrimination based on sex).
116. See id. (refusing to grant male employees standing because they did not
allege that they were discriminated against because they were male). In Patee, the
plaintiffs, who were a group of male employees employed in a position predominately held by females, claimed that their employer refused to grant them a pay
increase because the employer discriminated against women. See id. at 476-77. Refusing to grant the plaintiffs standing, the court explained that a male employee
can not assert the right of his female co-worker to be free from sex discrimination.
See id. at 478 (denying standing to plaintiffs asserting sex discrimination when discrimination is aimed at female employees). Thus, the court concluded that unless
a male employee brings a sex discrimination case alleging that he was discriminated against because he was a man, he does not have standing to bring a sex
discrimination suit under Title VII. See id. (same). In explaining its decision, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Waters and Trafficante from the present case. See id.
(noting differences). The Patee court explained that this case was different from
the Trafficante and Waters cases because here the male employees did not allege
that the sex discrimination deprived them of the benefits of interpersonal contacts
with women. See id. at 478-79 (noting that "[t]he serious consequences that flow
from the exclusion of persons because of discrimination in housing and in hiring
are not present here").
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In a more recent case, Childress v. City of Richmond,?17 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied standing to a group
of white men who alleged that disparaging remarks made to and about
female co-workers created a hostile work environment in violation of Title
VII.1 1 8 According to the Fourth Circuit, in order to qualify as a person
aggrieved, the "plaintiff must be a member of the class of direct victims
[discriminated against] .... that is, the plaintiff must assert his own statutory rights and allege that he, not someone else has been discriminate[d]
against .... 119 In so holding, the Fourth Circuit, as well as the Ninth
Circuit, concluded that Trafficante is not controlling precedent in sex dis120
crimination cases under Title VII.
117. 134 F.3d 1205 (4th Cir. 1998).
118. See id. at 1206-08 (stating facts of case).
119. Id. at 1209. According to the court, the phrase "aggrieved person" has
historically been "a 'term of art' ordinarily understood to mean those persons who
could satisfy both prudential and constitutional standing limitations." Id. at 1208;
see Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs v. Newport News, 514
U.S. 122, 126 (1995) (recognizing phrase "'person adversely affected or aggrieved'
is a term of art used by statutes to designate those who have standing"). Congress
can override the prudential standing requirements by defining the term "aggrieved person" differently in the statute. See Childress, 134 F.3d at 1208-09 (noting
that default rule that Congress has granted standing only to those who meet both
constitutional and prudential standing requirements applies unless Congress specifically redefines standing); see also Jordan, supra note 21, at 139 n.26 (noting
courts are required to apply term of art definition unless term is defined differently by Congress). Because Title VII failed to define the term "a person claiming
to be aggrieved," the Childress court concluded that Congress intended to use the
term of art "aggrieved person." See Childress, 134 F.3d at 1210 (finding congressional intent to use term of art "aggrieved person" in Title VII). Therefore, in the
Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff bringing a sex discrimination claim under Title VII will
not qualify as an "aggrieved person" unless he or she meets both constitutional
and prudential limitations. See id. at 1209 (concluding that plaintiff cannot assert
rights of others).
120. See Childress, 134 F.3d at 1209-10 (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 206 (1972) (noting that Tide VII has different standing
requirements than Title VIII)); Patee, 803 F.2d at 478 (stating Trafficante has no
application in sex discrimination cases under Title VII). In refusing to apply the
Trafficante's broad definition of standing to Title VII, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that Title VIII defined the term "aggrieved
person" for the purposes of the statute. See Childress, 134 F.3d at 1209 (noting Title
VIII defines "aggrieved person" as "any person who claims to have been injured by
a discriminatory housing practice"). Therefore, the United States Supreme Court
in Trafficante interpreted the term not as a term of art but as a statutorily defined
term. See id. (suggesting phrase "aggrieved person" is used as term of art in Title
VII but used as statutorily defined term in Title VIII). Because Title VIII statutorily
defines the term "aggrieved person" and Congress failed to define the term in
Title VII, the Fourth Circuit argued that the absence of a definition in Title VII
supports their view that standing should not be defined broadly in Title VII, but
rather should be narrowly construed to include prudential standing requirements.
See id. at 1210 (requiring that individuals bringing Title VII claim meet both constitutional and prudential limitations). Specifically, the Fourth Circuit argued that
the complete absence of a definition of the term in Title VII, coupled with a statutory definition of the term in Title VIII, suggests congressional intent to define the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45: p. 651

Not all courts take such a narrow view of "a person claiming to be
aggrieved" in sex discrimination cases under Title VII.' 2 1 For instance, in
Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc.,122 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana recognized that male plaintiffs have
standing to bring suit claiming sex discrimination, even though the discrimination was directed at women. 123 In Allen, the plaintiffs alleged that
American Food closed its plant because of the predominance of female
employees at the plant. 12 4 The plaintiffs further alleged that they were
persons aggrieved by their employer's sex discrimination because they lost
their jobs as a result of the sex discrimination against females. 125 According to the Allen court, "the scope of the language 'person aggrieved' confers standing to all persons injured by an unlawful employment
practice."1 26 Applying this broad definition of standing, the Northern District of Indiana concluded that the male employees had standing because
they suffered their own cognizable injuries due to the sex discrimination
27
aimed at the female employees.'
3.

Who Has Standing in a Title VII Case Brought in the Third Circuit?

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopts the
1 28
view that standing should be interpreted broadly in all Title VII cases.
According to the court in Hackett, the language "a person claiming to be
aggrieved" in Title VII demonstrates a congressional intention to describe
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III, thereby eliminating any
terms differently in the two statutes-broadly in Title VIII and narrowly in Title
VII. See id, at 1209 (declining to follow Trafficante).
121. For a discussion of courts that define standing broadly in cases where a
male employee is bringing suit for sex discrimination even though the discrimination was directed towards his female co-workers, see infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
122. 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986).

123. See id. at 1557 (holding that male employees who lost their jobs when
employer closed plant had standing to bring Title VII sex discrimination case even
though discrimination was directed at female employees because decision to close
plants may have been based on considerations of sex).
124. See id. at 1554-55 (stating facts of case).
125. See id. at 1555 (explaining plaintiffs' standing argument).
126. Id. at 1557 (citing Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982)).
127. See id. (granting male employees standing to bring Title VII sex discrimination suit because they were "assert[ing] their own injuries ... their own rights,"
and not rights of some third person).
128. See NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 907 F.2d 1408, 1412 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990)
(defining standing broadly to effectuate purposes of Title VII); Novotny v. Great
Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1244 (3d Cir. 1978) (same); Rosen v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1973) (stating Congress
intended standing for purposes of Title VII to be defined "as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution"); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446
(3d Cir. 1971) (stating standing in Title VII cases must be defined "as broadly as is
permitted by Article III of the Constitution").
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prudential standing requirements. 1 29 As a result, all that is necessary
confer standing on a plaintiff in a Title VII discrimination case brought
the Third Circuit is a showing that he or she was "sufficiently aggrieved
that he [or she] claims enough injury in fact to present a genuine case
controversy in the Article III sense .... "130

to
in
so
or

Despite its view that standing should be interpreted broadly in Title
VII cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

129. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446-47 (concluding standing in Title VII must be
defined broadly in order to effectuate Congress' purpose for enacting Title VII).
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Hackett,
"[t]he national public policy reflected ... in Title VII... may not be frustrated by
the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing .. " Id. at 44647.
130. Id. at 447. In Hackett, the employee was alleging that he had been discriminated against on the basis of race with respect to his employment. See id. at
444. At the time the suit was brought, however, the employee was no longer working for the employer but he was receiving pension benefits. See id. at 445. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the
employee's suit, stating that as a pensioner he was not an employee within the
meaning of Title VII and therefore did not have standing to sue for race discrimination under Title VII. See id. (stating procedural history). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, rejected the district court's conclusion and granted the employee standing. See id. (explaining district court erroneously relied upon definition of "employee" in § 701 (f) of Title VII when
concluding employee, as pensioner, lacked standing because definition section of
Title VII does not speak to issue of standing). According to the Third Circuit, "a
person claiming to be aggrieved" has standing to bring a Title VII discrimination
claim. See id. (defining standing under Title VII broadly). In defining "a person
claiming to be aggrieved," the court explained that "any person aggrieved by any
of the forbidden practices" meets the standing requirements even if the person was
never employed by the defendant. See id. (noting Title VII "forbids discrimination
not only by employers.., but also by potential employers ....labor organizations,
and by employment agencies").
Many other courts have adopted the test of standing developed in Hackett. See
Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 91 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that several
circuits have cited Hackett decision with approval and have expressly adopted
court's reasoning when construing Title VII's standing requirements); Clayton v.
White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679-80 (8th Cir. 1989) (defining standing
broadly in race discrimination claim under Title VII and citing Hackett to support
its holding); Stewart, 675 F.2d at 850 (same); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d
477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980) (same); EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 454 (6th Cir.
1977) (same); Waters v. Heublin, Inc., 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976)
(same). The circuits that have adopted the Hackett test have applied it when construing Title VII's standing requirements in race discrimination cases. See Anjelino,
200 F.3d at 91 (noting that other circuits follow Hackett when construing standing
in race discrimination claims under Title VII). Despite the wide acceptance of
Hackett in the race discrimination context, no other circuit has accepted such a
broad test for standing in sex discrimination claims under Title VII. But see Allen,
644 F. Supp. at 1557 (applying Hackett test to sex-based discrimination claim under
Title VII). For a discussion of the narrow approach the circuits take when construing standing in sex discrimination claims under Title VII, see supra notes 113-20
and accompanying text.
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placed a limit on who has standing to sue.13 1 Specifically, the Third Circuit requires that the person alleging to be aggrieved show a distinct and
palpable injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's discriminatory

practices before standing will be recognized. 132 To meet this burden, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Stephens v. Kerrigan133 held that the plaintiff must possess the qualifications that are necessary for the position. 134 If the plaintiff fails to possess the qualifications,
131. See Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 180 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that
plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by defendant's unlawful conduct and
not by some other factor).
132. See id. at 180 (stating test for standing is whether plaintiff is able to show
"some realistic threshold causal connection between the injury suffered and the
defendant's unlawful conduct"); see also Town of Harrison,907 F.2d at 1416 (noting
that without showing "a distinct and palpable injury" standing will not be
recognized).
133. 122 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1997).
134. See id. at 180-81 (noting plaintiff must show some realistic threshold
causal connection between employer's unlawful employment practice and injury
suffered); see also Doherty v. Rutgers Sch. of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 902 (3d
Cir. 1981) (denying law student standing to challenge alleged discriminatory minority admissions program because although student asserted injury--denial of
admission to law school-this loss was not caused by law school's minority admissions program, because law student was not otherwise qualified for admission);
Howard v. New Jersey Dep't of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1099, 1101-02 (3d Cir. 1981)
(noting that because employees were not qualified for job opportunity employer's
unlawful employment practice could not have caused their loss).
In Stephens, the plaintiffs, who were police officers at the Allentown Police
Department, alleged that they were denied promotions because they opposed or
failed to support the candidacy of the elected Mayor and/or supported his rival.
See Stephens, 122 F.3d at 173-76. Under the terms of the police department's promotion procedures, candidates were placed on the promotion list according to
their seniority and their scores from oral interviews and evaluations. See id. at 174.
Once all the candidates were placed, promotions were granted to the top three
officers on the list. See id. The plaintiffs, who were ranked within the top three
positions on the promotion lists, were passed over for promotions. See id. at 180-81
(noting that because plaintiffs occupied top three spots on promotion list they
were eligible for promotion). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs were qualified for the promotions; therefore,
they adequately established a basis for finding the requisite causation. See id. (concluding plaintiffs met burden of showing causal connection between their injury
and employer's alleged unlawful conduct). In so holding, the Third Circuit distinguished Stephens from Howard. See id. at 181 (recognizing differences between
cases). Specifically, the Third Circuit explained that unlike the employees in Stephens, who were qualified for the promotions, the employees in Howard were not
qualified for the job opportunities. See id. at 180-81 (noting differences between
Stephens and Howard). Therefore, the claims in Howard failed because the employees were not qualified for the job opportunity, which made them unable to establish a causal connection between the loss of ajob opportunity and the employer's
alleged discriminatory employment practices. See id. at 181 (concluding that unlike Howard, employees were qualified and were able to establish causal connection
between employer's alleged unlawful employment practices and their resulting injury). Although Stephens was a political discrimination case rather than an employment discrimination case, brought under Title VII, Stephens is relevant to this
discussion of Title VII because plaintiffs in a political discrimination case and the
plaintiffs in a Title VII case must satisfy similar tests to establish standing. See id. at
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then the employee is unable to claim that the loss of ajob opportunity was
caused by the employer's unlawful employment practices. 135 For exam136
ple, the Third Circuit in Howard v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service
refused to grant the plaintiffs standing to challenge the physical agility test
administered by the Newark Police Department as discriminatory against
women. 13 7 The Howard court refused to grant the plaintiffs standing because it concluded that they were not qualified to take the agility test be138
cause they had not passed the prerequisite civil service examination.
Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that there was no causal connection
because, even if the Newark Police Department did engage in unlawful
employment practices, the plaintiffs still would not have received the job
13 9
opportunity because they lacked the necessary qualifications.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF ANJELINO

v. NEw YORK TIMES Co.:

GRANTING MEN

STANDING IN SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

A. Issue, Facts and ProceduralPosture
In Anjelino, a group of former mail room employees ("Employees") at
the New York Times Company ("Times") brought an employment discrimination action against the Times. 140 Specifically, the Employees, who were
female and male, alleged discrimination by the Times on the basis of
sex. 141 Both the female and male Employees alleged they were victims of
sex discrimination on a daily basis with respect to compensation, assign176 (noting that political discrimination cases employ similar burden-shifting
mechanisms as those used in employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII). For a further discussion of Howard, see infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
135. See Stephens, 122 F.3d at 180-81 (granting standing to employees qualified
for promotions and concluding that they established basis for finding causation
because they were denied promotions even though they were qualified); see also
Howard, 667 F.2d at 1101-02 (concluding causal requirement of standing not met
because employees were not qualified to take physical agility test and their loss of
opportunity to take agility test was not caused by employer's alleged discrimination
against women, but rather by employees' lack of qualification); Doherty, 651 F.2d at
902 (denying standing to challenge law school admission program because law
student was not otherwise qualified for admission).
136. 667 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1981).
137. See id. at 1103 (noting students had no standing to sue because they
failed prerequisite written examination).
138. See id. at 1101-02 (concluding no causal connection between employer's
alleged discriminatory employment practices and employees' loss of job
opportunity.
139. See id. (noting plaintiffs failed to establish causal connection because
they were not qualified to take agility test).
140. See Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 1999).
141. See id.
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ment of work, abusive atmosphere and other terms and conditions of
employment.

142

The Employees, who were extras staffed at the Times, claimed "to
have been the subject of a 'day-in, day-out, year-in, year-out' barrage of
sexual discrimination .... ,,143 As extras, the Employees were substitute
workers that were hired on an as-needed basis according to their seniority
on a priority list kept by the Times' management.1 44 According to the
Employees, the daily sex-based discrimination interfered with their ability
to advance on the priority list.' 45 Specifically, the Employees claimed that

because of the discriminatory practices and beliefs at the Times, the management manipulated the policies regarding hiring from the priority list
in ways that limited the employment opportunities of females. 146 For instance, the Employees claimed that hiring for work shifts commonly

stopped just before the names of the women were reached on the priority
142. See id. at 83. Specifically, the Employees alleged that a hostile work environment was created by crude language and behavior directed at female employees by male mailroom employees and by male employees of the Times. See id. at
81. For instance, the male employees often yelled and subjected women to
demeaning and threatening language, such as continuously telling the female employees they "don't want women here." See id. at 82 (describing hostile environment). The female employees were also subjected to offensive comments about
their anatomy, such as a frequent comment by one of the supervisors, in which he
referred to a female employee's breasts by asking the male employees if they "moo,
moo.., want some milk." Id. The female employees were also continuously subjected to crude conduct such as the display of nude pictures throughout the workplace, the mooning of female workers and the hiring of a female stripper who
performed in the workplace during work hours. See id. (describing working conditions). According to the Employees, supervisory personnel at the Times were
aware of this discriminatory conduct but they failed to proscribe or discourage
such harassment or punish its perpetrators. See id. (discussing allegations of inaction by employer). For a discussion of the elements of a hostile work environment
claim, see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
143. Anjelino v. New York Times Co., No. Civ. A. 92-2582 1993 WL 170209, at
*3 (D.NJ. 1993).
144. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 79. Under the Times staffing plan, the mailroom
was to be staffed by regular, full-time employees and extras. See id. An extra's
seniority was determined by assessing the mailer's position on the publisher's priority list, which divided mailers into five categories, "A" through "E." See id. When
first hired, extras were placed on the "E" list and they were able to move up the list
by working a set number of shifts. See id. In order to be placed on the "A-B"
priority list, an extra was required to work at least 180 shifts during the preceding
year. See id. If an extra failed to meet the requirements for advancement to the "AB" priority list for two out of three successive years, the extra was automatically
delisted. See id.
145. See id. at 80 (stating facts). According to the Employees, a type of "leapfrogging" occurred repeatedly over time when men, who had less seniority on the
priority list, were hired for work shifts rather than the more senior female employees. See id. In addition, all but one of the Employees, both male and female, were
delisted from the list even though other male employees who had not complied
with the staffing requirements were not delisted. See id. at 76.
146. See id. at 80 (discussing Employees' allegations of discrimination).
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list.147

Neither female nor male employees beyond this point were

14 8

hired.
Fed up with the discriminatory practices, the Employees filed charges
of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).149 Both the female and male Employees filed charges alleging sex-based discrimination with regards to the terms and conditions of
employment and alleging that the discrimination created a hostile work
environment. 150 Additionally, the male Employees alleged that they were
"discriminatorily treated because [their] priority number[s] on the workplace seniority list [were] in between the priority numbers of the women
15 1
mailers... [and they claimed] [s]uch discrimination was based on sex."
The EEOC granted each employee a "notice of right to sue," and the Em52
ployees filed suit in the United States District Court of New Jersey.'
Upon reviewing the record, the district court dismissed the male Employees' claims for lack of standing to sue.15 3 Following the dismissal of their
claim, the male Employees appealed to the Third Circuit. 154 Specifically,
the Employees asked the Third Circuit to decide whether indirect victims
of sex-based discrimination have standing to assert claims under Title
VII. 155

B.
1.

The Third Circuit's Analysis of Standing in Title VII Claims - A
Developing Approach

Broadly Defining Standing in DiscriminationSuits Under Title VII
In Anjelino, the court took a broad view of standing in Title VII cases

and granted "indirect victims of sex-based discrimination ...

standing to

assert claims under Title VII if they allege colorable claims of injury-in-fact
that are fairly traceable to acts or omissions by defendants that are unlawful under the statute." 15 6 According to the court in Anjelino, as long as the
147. See id. (stating facts). This refusal to hire females for work shifts caused
the female Employees to lose hundreds of hours of work and wages and also to
lose seniority. See id.
148. See id. Thus, although the discrimination was directed only at females,
some male employees were also indirectly harmed by the discrimination. See id.
The male employees lost hours of work, wages and seniority because of the sexbased discrimination. See id. (noting both male and female Employees suffered
injury because of sex discrimination).
149. See id. at 84.
150. See id. (stating charges alleged by Employees).

151. Id. at 85.
152. See id.
153. See id. (noting that male Employees' claims were dismissed under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for lack of standing to sue, but female Employees' claims were
dismissed under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for lack of timeliness, including lack of continuing violations).

154. See id. at 86.
155. See id. at 88-89 (stating procedural history).
156. Id. at 92.
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plaintiff pleads a concrete injury-in-fact and a nexus between the injury
and the sex-based discrimination, the plaintiff will have standing even
though that discrimination was directly aimed at someone else. 15 7 This
holding is consistent with the Third Circuit's long-held belief that Congress intended standing for Title VII claims to be defined as broadly as is
permitted by Article 111.158
The Third Circuit explained its analysis of Title VII's broadly interpreted standing Hackett, in which an African-American plaintiff suffered
race-based discrimination in violation of Title VII. 159 In particular, he was
subjected to separate seniority and vacation schedules, harassment and intimidation, and the conditions of his employment were otherwise adversely affected because of his race. 160 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania refused to grant standing to the
plaintiff because when he brought suit he was no longer an employee of
the defendant. 161 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reversed the district court's holding, concluding that the
standing doctrine must not be interpreted in a way that frustrates Congress' purpose in enacting Title VII. 162 Referring to the language of Title
VII that grants standing to "a person claiming to be aggrieved," the Third
Court explained that "[a]n aggrieved person is obviously any person aggrieved by any of the [discriminatory] practices." 163 In Hackett, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted the broad definition
of standing for Title VII race discrimination cases; this definition has persisted in the Third Circuit and has been adopted by many otherjurisdic157. See id. (affirming idea that as long as indirect victim of sex-based discrimination satisfies standing requirements, he can sue for violation of Title VII).
158. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding
"the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' shows a congressional intention
to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III").
159. See id. at 444 (stating facts of case).
160. See id. (describing plaintiffs allegations of discrimination).
161. See id. at 445 (stating procedural history).
162. See id. at 446-47 (holding standing doctrine should be interpreted
broadly in Title VII cases in order to further Congress' goals for enacting Title
VII). Specifically the court stated:
The national public policy reflected ...

in Title VII ...may not be frus-

trated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing ....If the plaintiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims enough
injury in fact to present a genuine case or controversy in the Article III
sense, then he should have standing to sue in his own right ....
Id.

163. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). For instance, a plaintiff claiming he is discriminated against because of his race is aggrieved. See id. at 445-46 (concluding
plaintiff was aggrieved because of race-based discrimination and granting him
standing to sue). Likewise, a plaintiff who claims he suffered economic losses be-

cause of sex-discrimination is aggrieved. See Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200
F.3d 73, 89 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding male Employees were aggrieved because they
suffered pecuniary injury due to employer's discriminatory practices).
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tions. 164 The Third Circuit also eventually extended this broad definition
of standing to sex-based discrimination claims under Title VII via its holding in Anjelino.
2.

Extending the Broad Definition of Standing to Encompass Males in Sexual
DiscriminationSuits Under Title VII

As the district court correctly explained in Anjelino, the general rule is
that men do not have standing to bring claims of sex discrimination under
Title VII when the discrimination is directed at females. 16 5 Despite this
general rule, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit extended its broad definition of standing to the sexual discrimination context and concluded that an "aggrieved person" includes any person
adversely affected by sex-based discrimination, whether that person is male
or female. 1 66 Thus the court, referring to three exceptions to the general
rule that had been recognized by other courts, concluded that in some
instances a man has standing to sue for sex discrimination under Title
16 7
VII.
Under these exceptions, a male employee may bring a cause of
action for sex discrimination under Title VII if: "[1] male employees are
subjected to discrimination 'because they are men' . . . [2] discrimination
directed at women results in a loss of interpersonal rights with women;
[or] [3] sex-based discrimination results in pecuniary injury to both male
and female workers."1 68 The district court concluded that the injuries alleged by the male Employees did not fall into one of these three exceptions; therefore, the discrimination was aimed at the female employees
164. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 445 (granting standing in Title VII claim to any
plaintiff who has been "aggrieved by any of the forbidden practices"); see also Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 91 n. 25 (discussing other circuits that have applied Hackett's
rationale).
165. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 89 (noting most circuits conclude men do not
have standing to sue for sexual discrimination when discrimination is directed at
females).
166. See id. at 89-91 (extending broad definition of "aggrieved person" to sexual discrimination context, thereby granting male employees standing to sue for
sex discrimination directed at female employees when male has suffered some type
of injury because of discrimination).
167. See id. at 89 (granting men standing to sue in sex discrimination claims
under Title VII (citing Anjelino v. New York Times Co., No. Civ. A. 92-2582, 1993 WL
170209, at *10 (D.N.J. 1993) (noting exceptions to general rule that men do not
have standing to sue for sex discrimination directed towards females)).
168. Id. (citing Patee v. Pacific Northwestern. Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476, 478 (9th
Cir. 1986) (granting men standing to sue for sex discrimination under Title VII if
they are subjected to discrimination "because they are men"); Allen v. American
Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1557 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (noting male employees may sue for sex discrimination if sex-based discrimination results in pecuniary
loss to male employee). The exception granting standing to men who suffered a
loss of interpersonal rights with women as a result of sex discrimination towards
women was never specifically adopted by any other court. Cf Anjelino, 200 F.3d at
89 (noting that court found exception through reasoning by analogy from United
States Supreme Court's associational standing precedent in context of race
discrimination).
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directly and was without consequence to the male employees. 169 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reversed
the district court's holding and concluded that the Employees were "ag170
grieved persons" because their claims fell within the third exception.
The court concluded that the male Employees were aggrieved because
they suffered pecuniary loss through denial of advancement on the priority list as a result of the sex-based discrimination aimed at the female
1 71
Employees.
After concluding that the male Employees asserted an actionable injury, the court focused on the causation element of standing.' 7 2 The causation element of standing is met if the plaintiff shows that "the injury for
which redress is sought ...[is] traceable to the challenged actions of the
defendants, not to 'injury that results from the independent action of
some third party not before the court.""q 73 To meet this burden, the
Third Circuit in Stephens said the plaintiff must show that the discrimination was "more likely than not a motivating or substantial cause of the
1 74
adverse [employment] action."
The court in Anjelino concluded that the male Employees met this
burden and sufficiently demonstrated a nexus between the sexual discrimination directed at the female Employees and the male Employees' seniority on the priority list. 1 75 This conclusion is consistent with prior decisions
in the Third Circuit. 176 In prior cases considering whether a plaintiff had
standing to challenge alleged discriminatory practices in promotion decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has concluded that a plaintiff has standing if he or she shows that the employment
decision was based on an impermissible motive, and but for this motive,
169. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 89 (refusing to grant male Employee's standing
to bring sex-based discrimination claim under Title VII).
170. See id. at 90-92 (applying broad definition of standing and reversing district court's holding).
171. See id. (granting male Employee's standing to sue for sex
discrimination).
172. See id. at 91-92 (discussing causation).
173. Hospital Council v. City of Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 87 (3d Cir. 1991)
(citation omitted).
174. Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1997).
175. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92 (concluding causation element of standing
was met).
176. See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that being denied desired transfer after refusing supervisor's sexual advances is sufficient evidence for jury to conclude denial of transfer was caused by
employee's refusal of supervisor's advances); see also Stephens, 122 F.3d at 181 (explaining plaintiff must show some realistic causal connection between alleged injury and defendant's unlawful conduct); Howard v. NewJersey Dep't of Civil Serv.,
667 F.2d 1099, 1101-02 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Doherty v. Rutgers Sch. of LawNewark, 651 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that if plaintiff suffers loss of
some opportunity then causation element is satisfied if plaintiff can show he or she
was qualified for opportunity and would have received opportunity if it were not
for defendant's discriminatory practices).
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the plaintiff would have been qualified for the promotion. 177 Thus, consistent with its prior decisions, the court accurately concluded that the
male Employees established a realistic causal connection because they
would have been qualified to advance on the priority list if it were not for
178
the fact that their names fell after the names of the female Employees.
V.

PRACTITIONER's NOTES

Prior to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's
decision in Anjelino, a male employee was unable to bring a sex discrimination claim under Title VII to seek redress for a concrete injury that he
suffered as a result of discrimination aimed at female employees. 179 The
holding in Anjelino gives indirect victims of sex-based discrimination standing to assert claims under Title VII when they have suffered some cogniza180
ble injury as a result of the discrimination towards female co-workers.
Thus, the holding in Anjelino makes employers potentially liable to all persons affected by sex-based discriminatory practices, even if the discrimina181
tion was initially aimed at the opposite sex.
Despite the detail of the court's opinion, the decision in Anjelino
leaves several important questions unanswered. First, in Anjelino, the male
177. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1229 (noting evidence supports jury's finding
that supervisor refused to recommend employee for transfer because she refused
his advances). For a further discussion of a prior Third Circuit holding that the
causation element is satisfied only if the plaintiff would have been qualified for the
job opportunity see, supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
In Robinson, the employee alleged that her employer sexually harassed her on
several different occasions. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1291 (stating facts). The employee never acceded to the sexual advances and she made it clear to the supervisor that the conduct was unwelcome. See id. Eventually, the supervisor informed
the employee that he was not going to recommend her for a transfer to the detective bureau, even though he had repeatedly told her in the past that he would
make such a recommendation. See id. at 1298. She filed suit claiming among
other things that she was denied a transfer to the detective bureau because she had
repeatedly rebuffed her supervisor's advances. See id. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable fact finder to conclude the employee was denied the transfer because she
refused her supervisor's advances. See id. (concluding employee established claim
for sexual discrimination). In so holding, the Third Circuit explained "that, in
contrast to minor slights like 'negative comments,' receiving or being denied a
promotion is sufficiently serious and tangible to constitute a change in the employee's 'terms, conditions, or privileges' of employment." Id. at 1299 (citations
omitted).
178. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92 (finding causal connection between em-

ployer's sex-based discriminatory employment practices and employees alleged
injury).
179. For a discussion of the development of standing in Title VII cases
brought in the Third Circuit, see supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
180. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 92 (concluding fact that "the injury at issue is
characterized as indirect is immaterial, as long as it is [a colorable claim of injuryin-fact that is fairly] traceable to the defendant's unlawful acts or omissions").
181. See generally id. (holding employers liable for injuries suffered by male
employees that resulted from discrimination aimed at female employees).
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Employees bringing suit suffered some pecuniary loss as a result of the
discrimination aimed at the female Employees. 182 If the male Employees
did not suffer any type of financial loss, but rather alleged as their injury
the loss of associations with female co-workers, would the male Employees
be granted standing to sue? Second, the Employees claimed that their
employer's discriminatory employment practices created a hostile work
environment.1 83 Thus, in granting relief, the court granted standing to
male employees who brought a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. But would the court also grant standing to male employees bringing a quid pro quo sexual harassment suit?
As to the first unanswered question, one could assume that a male
employee alleging that his employer's discriminatory practices towards women caused him to lose the benefits of associations with female co-workers
would have standing to sue. 18 4 In Anjelino, the Third Circuit acknowledged that other courts had recognized that there are three situations
85
when a man has standing to sue for sex discrimination under Title VII.
Specifically, a man has standing to sue when he is discriminated against
because he is a man, when the discrimination towards women results in a
loss of association with women and when he has suffered some pecuniary
loss as a result of discrimination towards women.18 6 Although the court
did not expressly adopt each of these exceptions in Anjelino, by mentioning the exceptions, perhaps the court intended to express its approval of
them. 18 7 Furthermore, it is the Third Circuit's policy to define standing
broadly in Title VII cases.' 8 8 Therefore, because the United States Supreme Court recognizes standing when the plaintiff alleges that race-based
discriminatory practices caused him to lose the benefits of interracial contacts, it is likely that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit will follow the Supreme Court's sweeping approach and grant
182. See id. at 89 (noting that although the discrimination was directed only at
females, some male Employees were also indirectly harmed by the discrimination).
183. See id. at 80 (noting employees claim of hostile work environment).
184. Compare id. (granting male employees alleging injury as a result of employer's discriminatory practices towards women standing), with Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (concluding that employee had standing
to sue for racial discrimination aimed at minority co-workers because employee
suffered injury when employer denied employee access to important interracial
associations with minority co-workers).
185. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 89 (noting that three exceptions to general rule
that men do not have standing in sex discrimination cases have been recognized).
186. For a discussion of the exceptions, see supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
187. See Anjelino, 200 F.3d at 89 (noting only that male Employees fall into
third exception, which provides that male employees may have standing if sexbased discrimination results in pecuniary loss to both male and female workers).
188. See Hackett v. McGuire Bros., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971) (noting
standing should be defined broadly in discrimination cases brought under Title
VII cases).
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sex discrimination
standing to a male plaintiff alleging that his employer's
18 9
interfered with his right to associate with women.
As to the second unanswered question, it is possible that the court
would grant a male plaintiff standing to sue for quid pro quo sexual harassment directed towards his female co-workers. Although the Ninth Circuit and Fourth Circuit have concluded that a male employee cannot
assert the rights of his female co-workers, the Third Circuit is unlikely to
define standing so narrowly.' 90 It has been the Third Circuit's policy to
construe standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III, thereby ignoring any prudential limitations.' 91 Consequently, if the Third Circuit continues to follow this policy, it will allow men to assert the rights of females
by suing for quid pro quo sexual harassment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in
Anjelino represents its desire to promote the goals of Congress by granting
more individuals standing in Title VII claims. l9 2 Specifically, the court's
decision demonstrates the desire to protect any employee who is indirectly
or directly affected by discriminatory practices, regardless of the basis of
the discrimination. 1 9 3 Although other circuits have defined standing
broadly in race discrimination claims brought under Title VII, no other
circuit has interpreted standing broadly for claims based on sex discrimination. 194 The court's holding in Anjelino warns employers that courts in
the Third Circuit will allow any employee who is "aggrieved by forbidden
practices" to bring suit in order to fight discrimination in the workplace.' 95 In so holding, the Third Circuit has moved one step closer to
reviving "[t]he hopeful prospects that Title VII offered millions of Ameri-

189. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court's decision granting
standing to plaintiffs alleging a loss of interracial associations as a result of racially
discriminatory practices, see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
190. For a further discussion of the views of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits on
standing, see supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
191. See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446 (stating standing in Title VII cases must be
defined "as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution").
192. For a discussion of Congress' purpose for enacting Title VII, see supra
notes 1, 20-24 and accompanying text.
193. See generally Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 92 (3d Cir.
1999) (granting indirect victims of discrimination standing).
194. For a discussion of the circuit split regarding who has standing to sue in
a sex discrimination case under Title VII, see supra notes 9-14 and accompanying
text.
195. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding, see supra notes 156-78
and accompanying text.
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cans in 1964,"196 which is the prospect of working in an environment free

of discrimination.

19 7

Christine Coyne

196. H.R. ReP. No. 92-238, at 4-5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137,
2140-41.

197. When amending Title VII in 1972, Congress explained that the "experiences of the last 6 years under Title VII, while in many respects reflecting major
advancements in securing equal opportunity for all Americans, nonetheless are
disappointing in terms of what.., women in this country have a right to expect."
Id. at 5. Thus, Congress proclaimed that the "time has come to bring an end to job
discrimination once and for all, and to insure every citizen the opportunity for the
decent self-respect that accompanies ajob commensurate with one's abilities." Id.
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